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AN ANSWER TO THE "EUROPEAN WAR."^
BY M. JOURDAIN.
ONE of the leading characteristics of The Open Court is that it
is really open to discussion, and it is in keeping with the very
liberal views of Dr. Paul Carus, a German by birth and sympathies,
that I am allowed to discuss and dissent from his views upon the
European war published in the October number of The Open Court,
and with other articles in the same number. Dr. Carus's article
(pp. 596-646) deals by sections with questions that have arisen in
connection with the war ; and following his arrangement, I propose
to summarize his arguments and, so far as they seem to me mis-
leading, to question them. The first section is
:
PANSLAVISM.
After a summary of the characteristics of the Slav races and
the well-known disunion of the Austro-Hungarian empire, the Edi-
tor turns to the incident of the assassination of the heir-apparent to
the throne of Austria and his wife at Sarajevo, on June 23, 1914.
There was, he says, no public sympathy throughout Europe for the
crime; and yet we read: "No crime has ever aroused deeper or
more general horror throughout Europe ; none has ever been less
justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both the govern-
ments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support her
in many measures, however severe, which she might think it neces-
sary to take for the punishment of the murderer and his accom-
plices."-
The opinion of the Russian, French, and German governments
^ We publish this article from England as the most comprehensive reply
to the editorial position that we have received.
—
Ed.
^ Throughout this article I have used for convenience's sake the cheap re-
print of the English White Paper (which also includes Sir Edward Grey's
speech of August 3, and other matter) entitled Great Britain and the European
Crisis, London, 1914. I shall refer to this as G. B. and tlie E. C. Here the




was that the Servian government was not to blame for the crime,
but that Servia must investigate and put an end to the propaganda
which had apparently led to it. Sir Edward Grey advised Servia
to show herself moderate and conciliatory.^ Unless it were proved
that the Servian government had connived at or incited to the
crime ; or unless the Servian government were to conduct an in-
vestigation in such a way as to screen the conspiracy, there was
no reason for declaration of war, or a punitive expedition against
Servia. A declaration of war on Austria's part on the ground
that she "did not trust the Servians to be impartial"* is absurd.
The first open step on Austria's part was an ultimatum de-
livered at Belgrade, requiring an answer in forty-eight hours. The
ten demands involved the suppression of anti-Austrian newspapers,
literature and propaganda, the suppression of nationalist societies
such as the Narodna Odbrana ; the dismissal of officers and func-
tionaries "guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian mon-
archy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian government
reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the royal gov-
ernment" (of Servia), participation of Austrian officials in judicial
proceedings in Servia, the arrest of two individuals compromised
by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Sarajevo; the preven-
tion of illicit traffic in arms across the frontier, an explanation of
anti-Austrian utterances by high Servian officials, and finally the
immediate notification of the enforcement of these measures. In
addition, a prescribed statement was to be published by the Servian
government in the official journal, condemning anti-Austrian propa-
ganda and regretting the participation of Servian officers and func-
tionaries therein.^ A summary of the secret trial at Sarajevo was
annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare findings, with no corrobo-
rative evidence.
As Sir Edward Grey wrote to Sir Maurice de Bunsen,^ he had
"never before seen one state address to another independent state
a document of so formidable a character." The demand for the
participation of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Servia
was "hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's inde-
pendent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might,
that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with the right to appoint
officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia."
^ Ibid., p. iv.
" Opeit Court for October, 1914, p. 599. In future the letters O. C. will
denote that issue of Tlie Open Court.
° G. B. and the E. C, pp. 3-9.
" British ambassador at Vienna.
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The Editor admits that this "sounds very fair."' It is, in fact,
unanswerable ; and no other Hne of action would be possible even
in the imaginary case he adduces, "if the Prince of Wales had been
assassinated and some little nationality on the moral level of Servia
were for good reasons suspected of having helped in the deed,
plotting renewals of the crime so as to endanger the British govern-
ment and its royal family." I do not think that an Englishman
would have his sense of justice warped by national considerations.
Before the expiration of the time-limit of the ultimatum,
Servia returned to Austria a reply amounting to an acceptance of
all the demands,^ subject on certain points to the delays necessary
for passing new laws and amending her constitution, and subject
to Austria-Hungary's explanation as to her wishes with regard to
the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servian judicial
proceedings. "The Royal Government must confess that they do
not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made
by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake
to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal
Government upon their territory, but they declare they will admit
such collaboration as agrees with the principles of international law,
with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations."''
This reply went beyond anything which any power—Germany
not excepted—thought probable.^*^ This was the more remarkable
as the time-limit of the ultimatum was as unnecessary as insolent.
The impression left upon the mind of Sir Maurice de Bunsen was
that the note was "so drawn up as to make war inevitable." "This
country," he writes, "has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war
with Servia and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly
be a great disappointment.^^ In this temporary blindness of a
people, the Austrian ministers were borne along on a wave of vio-
lent enthusiasm, in which they said themselves that they would be
dislodged from power if they did not accede to the popular demand
for the punishment of Servia. ^-
'' O. r.,, p. 599. ' G. B. and the E. C, pp. 22-27.
" G. B. and the E. C, p. 25. Servia concluded by proposing, in case the
Austro-Hungarian government were not satisfied with the reply, "to accept a
pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the
international tribunal of the Hague, or to the great powers which took part
in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian government on
March 31, 1909."
^°
"German secretary of state has himself said that there were some
things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept."
G. B. and the E. C, p. 29.
" G. B. and the E. C, p. 27.
^ Ibid., p. vii.
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As Servia consented to dismiss and prosecute those officers who
could be clearly proved to be guilty and had already arrested the
officer referred to in the Austro-Hungarian note, it is not correct
to speak of "Russia's protection of assassins. "^''*
Equally incorrect is the statement by the Editor: "That Eng-
land rushed at once to the support of the methods of Panslavism
is incomprehensible except on the assumption that England favored
the plan of a most stupendous war in which Germany's prosperity,
her manhood, her civilization, would be buried under the armies of
the invading Russ."^*
The British government's attitude was that she had no interest
in the Balkans except the consolidation and progressive government
of the Balkan states. Sir Edward Grey's concern in the Austro-
Hungarian note and the reply of Servia was "simply and solely
from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the
dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of His
Majesty's government."^^ Sir George Buchanan, British ambassa-
dor at St. Petersburg, telegraphed (on July 24) that "direct British
interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country
would never be sanctioned by British public opinion."^'' British
intervention in the European crisis only followed Germany's viola-
tion of Belgian neutrality on August 3. As the Austro-Hungarian
note was presented to Servia on July 23, and war was declared by
England on Germany on August 4, England's intervention cannot
be described as hurried or determined by the action of Russia.
The Editor proceeds to praise the German emperor as the
prince of peace. "The Kaiser," he writes, "is a peaceful man. If
any one deserves the Nobel peace prize it is he. Since his ascent
to the throne he has preserved the peace of Europe, often under
the most difficult conditions. The bellicose party of Germany has
often been disgusted with the Kaiser's policy and called him Wil-
liam the Pacific. "^'^ It is perhaps premature to assume that the
German emperor is the sole cause of Germany's attitude ;^^ but
turning to his acts and utterances, is it peace that he proclaimed so
loudly in the days before the war? Was the author of those won-
"O.C, p. 599. '*Ibid.
^'G. B. and the E. C, p. 9. '"Ibid., p. 10. " O. C, p. 600.
" In December 1910 he sent his portrait to the minister of education with
the significant motto, Si volo, sic jubeo. The words of the minister completed
the quotation. On May 4, 1891, at a Rhenish banquet, he said: "There is but
one master in the country ; it is I, and I will bear no other." In a speech at
Konigsberg, May 25, 1910, he wrote : "Considering myself as the instrument
of the Lord, without heeding the views and opinions of the day I go my way"
—an attitude which might lead to breaches of the peace.
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derful Wardour Street phrases of "the mailed fist" and "shining
armour" so pacific? In a speech of his deHvered on March 1, 1900,
on the completion of a fort, he said : "I christen thee Fort Haeseler.
Thou wilt be called upon to defend the conquests of Germany over
the western foes." Seven months later, in celebrating Moltke's
birthday, he expressed a desire that "thy staff may lead Germany
to further victories." The man who could proclaim that "nothing
must be settled in this world without the intervention of Germany
and the German emperor" cannot be the most pacific of European
sovereigns. That the English people had some just cause for un-
easiness in the past may be seen from a very courageous and tem-
perate article in the Frankfurter Zeitting, December 29, 1911 : "We
shall be obliged to admit that the distrust on the other side of the
English Channel is not altogether unfounded. If we had to listen
to such utterances from the mouth of a foreign sovereign, we too
would become restive and take thought for the strengthening of our
line of defense. At present we can only ask England not to take
so seriously the utterances in question, since we have long ago had
the experience that great words are not followed by great deeds.
We know that the Kruger telegram, the challenge to the yellow
races, the speech at Damascus, the trip to Tangier, the sending of
the "Panther," and so on. were only outward gestures which re-
mained without any corresponding consequences. This is one of
the weakest points of our foreign policy. We say to England
again and again : 'The German nation is absolutely peaceably-
minded, and wishes to live on terms of peace and friendship with
England just as much as with all other nations.' This makes 'no
impression on them, since they answer us : 'We are glad to believe
that the German nation is peaceably-minded, but the German nation
does not make German policy. Her policy is made in a quarter
which is absolute, irresponsible, and incalculable ; and for that rea-
son we attach merely a Platonic, and never a practical, value to the
national professions of peace.' What answer are we to make to
that ?"
"Who can believe," writes the Editor,^'' "that Germany wanted
a war of such dimensions, that she provoked it or ventured into it
for lust of fame or with an expectation of conquest? What can she
gain?" The answer to this is twofold. Firstly, there has existed
an aggressive war literature in Germany which has no parallel in
any other country. \"on Treitschke condemns perpetual peace as
the "dream of weary, spiritless, and exhausted ages," while Bern-
" O. C, p. 600.
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hardi, echoing Treitschke, speaks of war as "an indispensable factor
of culture, in which a truly civilized nation finds the highest ex-
perience." In the latter author's works war with France and Russia
simultaneously is hopefully anticipated, for "in one way or another
we must square our account with France .... This is the first and
foremost condition of a sound German policy .... France must be
so completely crushed that she can never again come across our
path. A pacific agreement with England is, after all, a will-o'-the-
wisp which no serious German statesman would trouble to follow.
We must always keep the possibility of war with England before
our eyes and arrange our political and military plans accordingly."
As Bernhardi (who died in 1913) was a prominent German gen-
eral, high up in the general staff, his aspirations have a certain
degree of authority. And apart from militarist writers, every trav-
eler in Germany has come face to face with what Sir Walter Raleigh
aptly calls "the cheerful brutality of their political talk."-" "I re-
member meeting," he adds, "with a Prussian nobleman, a well-bred
and pleasant man, who was fond of expounding the Prussian creed.
He was said to be a political agent, but he certainly learned nothing
in conversation .... The error of the Germans, we were told, was
always that they are too humane ; their dislike of cruelty amounts
to a weakness in them. They let France escape with a paltry fine,
next time France must be beaten to the dust. Always with a pleas-
ant outward courtesy, he passed on to England. England was de-
cadent and powerless, her rvile must pass to the Germans. 'But we
shall treat England rather less severely than France,' said this bland
apostle of Prussian culture. .. .The grossness of the whole thing
was in curious contrast with the polite and quiet voice with which
he uttered his insolences." It is impossible not to draw the con-
clusion that war with Russia and France was expected, one might
say desired, by an influential party in Germany. That she did not
desire a "war of such dimensions" is quite evident from the bids
for English neutrality.-^ Yet she inevitably drew England into the
war by her violation of the neutrality of Belgium ; and both Austria
and Germany were quite aware of the fact that the note to Servia
might lead to a European war. The German White Book informs
us that the Austrian government informed the German government
of their "conception" of the situation and asked their opinion. The
White Book comments as follows
:
"With all our heart we were able to agree with our ally's esti-
"" Might is Right. Oxford pamphlets, 1914, p. 12.
-^ G. B. and the E. C, p. 45.
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mate of the situation, and assure him that any action considered
necessary to end the movement in Servia directed against the con-
servation of monarchy would meet with our approval.
"We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of
Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field,
and that it might, therefore, involve us in a war, in accordance
with our duty as allies. "--
In the second place, Germany showed no wish to work for
peace when the key of the situation lay with Berlin. While Russia,
France and England initiated and supported peaceful measures, the
German chancelor claimed that none should intervene between
Austria and Servia.-''
The remaining arguments of the Editor that the causes of the
war are "the Erench lust for revenge"-' and "England's determina-
tion not to allow Germany to appear on the field of commerce as
her rival, "-^' and "the anti-German policy of the British govern-
ment"-'' are more conveniently treated of under the sections on the
"Foes of Germany" and the "English Point of View." The state-
ment that "Germany has been cut off from the rest of the world"
is hardly correct, as the German official wireless is sent out and is
published daily in the English newspapers, while German news-
papers can be easily obtained.
A BREACH OF NEUTRALITY.
The Editor claims that on the part of England Germany's breach
of neutrality on Belgium was only an official pretext for the war,
"not the real and ultimate motive." This certainly does not represent
the attitude of England towards the neutrality of Belgium or Hol-
land. Their independence had been for centuries considered as
one of the strongest means for securing peace in Europe, as their
position and conformation rendered them the natural battlefield of
Northern Europe ; of this their troublous history is sufficient proof.
"If it was made impossible for great powers to invade them
war would become increasingly difficult and dangerous. \\\\\\ the
growth of the idea of a fixed system of international law founded
on treaties the neutrality of Belgium had been devised as a perma-
nent safeguard to this end. As such it had been consecrated by
two international treaties signed by all the powers, and recognized
by two generations of statesmen.'"-^ As Sir Walter Raleigh says, it
=-" German White Book, p. 4. == G. B. and the E. C. p. 12.
'* O. C, p. 600. -' Ibid. =" Ibid.
' G. B. and the E. C, p. viii.
78 THE OPEN COURT.
was a matter of common knowledge in England that one event
would make it impossible for England to remain a spectator in a
European war,—that event being the violation of the neutrality of
Holland or Belgium.-* There was never any secret about this and
it was well known to many people who took no special interest in
foreign politics. The stress laid upon the importance of Belgian
neutrality in speeches by Lord Granville in the House of Lords
(August 8, 1870) and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons
August 10, 1870) is emphasized again in Sir Edward Grey's speech
in the House of Commons on August 3 last.-^
The wrong done by Germany has no parallel in the instances
of earlier breaches of neutrality quoted by the Editor.'"' The only
recent instance quoted is the landing of British troops in Delagoa
Bay at the beginning of the Boer war. Portugal is an old ally of
England, and conceded permission to the British consul at Lorenzo
Marques to search for contraband of way among goods imported
there, and accorded free passage to an armed force under General
Carington from Beira through Portuguese territory to Rhodesia.
"The Portuguese government exposed itself to no international
difficulty through allowing a belligerent, whose final victory was
certain and of necessity entailed total suppression of the conquered
belligerent, to cross its colonial territory,"^^ and this incident cannot
be compared with Germany, one of the guarantors of Belgian neu-
trality, invading Belgium when that country, conscious of its duty,
was "firmly resolved to repel aggression by all possible means."
The earlier instances of breaches of neutrality instanced are
the seizure of Capetown and the annexation of Dutch colonies.
The Dutch colony of New Netherland was seized by England in
time of peace, in 1664 ;—a discreditable action, but this and other
political measures of the seventeenth century are no precedents for
us to-day. Late in the eighteenth century, when the organiza-
tion of the united Netherlands was abolished, and they were trans-
formed into the Batavian republic, in close alliance with France,
the Dutch participation in the wars of the Revolution naturally
brought with it the enmity of England, and the seizure of all the
Dutch colonies by the English.
Further, the Editor writes that there is no use discussing the
atrocity of a breach of neutrality "because it is an acknowledged
principle that in case of war the natural law of self-preservation
-^ Might is Right. Oxford pamphlets, 1914, p. 6.
=" G. B. and the E. C, p. 93. '» O. C, p. 601. '
^^ Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., Vol. XIX, s.v. "Neutrality," p. 477.
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demands of every power the completion of the war that has arisen
or is about to arise, with the utmost dispatch and by the easiest
method. In the present case the Germans have carried the war
through Luxembourg and Belgium because that was to them the
straightest and safest way of attack."^- It is significant to recall
here that von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German imperial chancelor,
in his speech to the Reichstag on August 4, while laying stress on
Germany's "state of necessity," confesses openly that the invasion
of Luxembourg and Belgium is "contrary to the dictates of inter-
national law," a wrong committed.
"It is true that the French government," he said, "has declared
at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Bel-
gium as long as her opponent respects it. We knew, however, that
France stood ready for the invasion. France could wait, but we
could not wait. A French movement upon our flank upon the
Lower Rhine might have been disastrous. So we were compelled
to override the just protests of the Luxembourg and Belgian gov-
ernments. The wrong—I speak openly—that we are committing
we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has
been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are threatened,
and is fighting for his highest possessions, can have only one
thought—how he is to hack his way through."
The Imperial Chancellor, was, we see, unaware of this "ac-
knowledged principle" of the Editor's. As Mr. Lloyd George has
said, "treaties are the currency of international statesmanship,"
and it is obviously to the interest of each country to see that such
international treaties are valid not only in peace (when nobody
proposes to break them) but also in war. An apology advanced by
the Editor is that Prussia and Germany had signed the neutrality
treaty of Belgium, the present German empire not then existing,
and Germany need not respect the treaty "under conditions so ob-
viously changed." Prince Bismarck in 1870, when there was war
between France and Germany, "confirming his verbal assurance
gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in
reference to the treaty in existence—that the German confederation
and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium." Bismarck
here speaks not of Prussia but of the German confederation, repre-
senting the German empire of to-day. The present conditions
appear closely parallel to those of 1870, and it was for such an
event as a Franco-German war that the neutrality of Belgium had
been devised as a safeguard. The Editor considers an important
=- O. C, pp. 601-2.
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change in the conditions was created by "the suspicion, "^'^ the
"probabihty" of a Franco-Belgian entente. "Suspicion" in the
German mind is not sufficient to justify such a breach of inter-
national law. No serious evidence is advanced of a Franco-
Belgian entente, while, on the other hand, we have the French
government's assurance that it would respect the neutrality of
Belgium in answer to Sir Edward Grey's inquiry:
"The French government is resolved to respect the neutrality
of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other power
violating that neutrality, that France might find herself under the
necessity, in order to assure the defense of her security, to act
otherwise. The president of the republic spoke of it to the king
of the Belgians, and the French minister at Brussels has spon-
taneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian minister of for-
eign affairs to-day.""^ France could have no object in alienating
the sympathies of England by violating Belgian neutrality, and
Belgium on her side (August 1) intended to maintain her neutrality
to the utmost of her power.'*"' On August 3"" she even refused the
five h>ench army corps offered her through the French military
attache for protecting her neutrality against the Germans, and did
not "propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers."
In face of these facts we must discount unsupported stories
such as that French officers were present prior to the declaration
of war, in Liege, that "Lord Kitchener was in Belgium two weeks
before the war began, "^^ if the letter of the staff correspondent
of the New York Evening Post in London is to be accepted. The
presence of English and French officers in Belgium before the Ger-
mans invaded that country has been officially denied by the Belgian
government. Assuming that England and France planned how
they would act if Germany did precisely what she has done, "to
say that it was a violation of neutrality for England and France
to plan an advance how, if necessary, they would perform the
duties put upon them by the treaty establishing Belgian neutrality
is to insult the intelligence."^^ A German plan of campaign against
the United States of America has recently been published, which
has not yet caused that country to attack Germany on suspicion of
hostile intentions.
^^ "We do not know all the secret occurrences of European politics, but the
probability is that the Belgians had agreed to allow the French to march
through Belgium.
.. .M<?r^ suspicion of a Franco-Belgian entente is sufficient
to attack France through the Belgian frontier." O. C, p. 602, The italics
here used for emphasis were not in the original.
''G. B. and the E.C'^p. 93-94. '' Ibid., p. 67. '' Ibid., p. 75.
''O. C, pp. 602 and 603. ''The Nation (New York), October 29, 1914.
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The argument that it was "preferable to the Germans to an-
ticipate the French move and take Belgium first" errs Hke the Ger-
man manifesto "To the Civilized World" in assuming an unproved
and improbable French violation of Belgian neutrality. But even
granted that this contention were true, what does it amount to?
That Germany hurried to violate a law before some one else could
do so ; and "if anybody was going to murder Belgian neutrality
she was going to be first at the job."
"A stray notice in the North German Gazette'' "later reports,"
"a newspaper clipping" from a German paper, cannot be considered
serious evidence. Information supplied from these doubtful sources
is on its face doubtful. The statement^'' that large deposits of am-
munition were stored by England in the fortress of Maubeuge be-
fore the continental war, is officially denied. The giving of wide
publicity to absurd stories such as the "later reports" that "some
Russian officers had adopted the custom of carrying on their per-
sons the fingers of their slain enemies, both male and female" is to
be deprecated. Stories of atrocities are circulated by all the com-
batant nations without exception ; and it is impossible to accept
any without a careful preliminary investigation.
The Editor quotes from the Independent (September 21, 1914) :
"On August 1 the British Ambassador was asked a second time
whether England would remain neutral in case Germany respected
the integrity of France and also her colonies. Here England again
said she must be free to act." This correctly summarizes Sir Edward
Grey's earlier communication (July 30) in which a similar proposal^"
is declared unacceptable. "For France, without further territory in
Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her
position as a great power and become subordinate to German
policy."*^
It is difficult to see where the Editor has gained " psychological
insight into the manner in wdiich the Russian minister induced Sir
Edward Grey to join the French-Russian alliance. The English
had supported Servia in diplomacy, and the Russians hinted that
after all the English would not be credited with making good by
joining the fight,'*- and it seems that the Russian suggestion helped
to bring the English into line."*" The suggestion that England
'« Published in Gil Bias, February 25, 1913.
*" Except that in this case the French colonies were not safeguarded.
" G. B. and the E. C, p. 55.
" For the discussion of England's attitude during the Schleswig-Holstein
complication (O. C, p. 604) see below section on the "Foes of Germany."
" O. C, p. 604.
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acted from mere pique is naive and unsupported. The facts are
that on July 24 and 25 M. Sazonoff, the Russian minister for for-
eign affairs, pressed Great Britain to make a declaration of soli-
darity with Russia and France, adding that "unfortunately Ger-
many was convinced that she could count on your neutrality." On
July 29, Sir Edward Grey outlined to Sir F. Bertie, British am-
bassador at Paris, a conversation with the French ambassador in
London, in which he says clearly in what circumstances England
would not intervene,** i. e., not in a dispute between Austria and
Servia, nor in a dispute between Russia, Servia and Austria. Even
if "Germany became involved and France became involved, we had
not made up our minds what we should do ; it was a case that we
should have to consider."*" We see Sir Edward Grey moved by
English interests and obligations.
THE ENGLISH POINT OF VIEW.
There has been a commercial conflict between England and
Germany,*^ two great manufacturing countries
;
just as there has
been a struggle for markets between England and America. But
the latter struggle has not led to war, and the relations between
the two countries have never been better. Commercial rivalry is
not, therefore, the only cause of our recent alienation from Ger-
many ; but, as the Editor rightly points out, "propaganda." But
while he draws attention to the anti-German propaganda in Eng-
land (relatively small) he omits to refer to the enormous and in-
fluential anti-English propaganda in Germany. The Editor points
to an article in the Saturday Reviezv, September 11, 1897,*^ as the
first expression of anti-German policy in England, but the violently
anti-English utterances of Treitschke date as early as 1874. Later,
the German professor Karl Lamprecht seized upon the Boer war
to demonstrate to Holland that England is the enemy ; and Bern-
hardi is also anti-English. Now while in Germany the feeling
against England has raised in the past a crop of aggressive pro-
fessors, lectures and books, in England the feeling against Germany
did not lead to dreams of conquest but to fear of invasion ; of the
"German peril." Instead of Germany and the Next War, we had
The Englishman's Home. Even to-day, in the midst of war, the
English press references to Germany are temperate when compared
with German references to England.
" G. B., and the E. C, pp. 9, 16. *Ubid., p. 46. " O. C, p. 607.
" Reprinted in O. C, pp. 577-579. There is, however, no reason to sup-
pose with the Editor that the article was "inspired by the British government"
(O. C, p. 607).
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A third factor in the creation of national hostiHty was the
matter of armaments, especially the navy. The English case for
a predominant navy is England's insular position, which renders her
liable to starvation directly she loses command of the sea ; the im-
mensely larger size of her mercantile marine, which needs protec-
tion ; her colonies, and the fact that she maintains but a small army.
In the competition in armaments it is worth noting that on the eve
of the Hague conference of 1888, Mr. Goschen announced that if
the other naval powers should be prepared to diminish their pro-
grams of ship-building, we should be prepared on our side to
meet such a procedure by modifying ours ; the German government
replied, by Colonel von Schwarzhoff, their delegate at the con-
ference, with a scornful speech. At the second Hague conference
in 1907, the British proposal to consider a concerted arrest of arma-
ments was politely shelved, the German delegate, Baron Marschall
von Bieberstein refusing to discuss it. The question of total dis-
armament has not been raised, and we cannot tell whether she
would "abolish her militarism if her neighbors, the French and the
Russians, would disarm, and if the English would sell their navy
as old iron,"**^ but she has certainly refused on several occasions
the invitation to slacken competition in armaments.
THE GERMAN CAUSE.
There is very little to discuss in this section, in which patriotic
poems are quoted. In the concluding paragraph, however, a list is
given of indefensible and partly-defensible English wars,*^ such
as the Opium war in China, and the Boer war of the Transvaal.'^"
All nations, unfortunately, have some blots in their accounts, but
especially Prussia, from the day of Frederick the Great's brazen
theft of Silesia to the cold-blooded quarrel with Austria in 1866
and the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 which was contrived by
Bismarck down to its precipitation by the falsified Ems telegram. ^^
THE FOES OF GERMANY.
An accusation is made against England of stirring others to
" O. C, p. 608. "O. C, pp. 612-613.
°''
"Was the Boer War undertaken for the protection of English homes and
English liberty?" asks the Editor (p. 613). Certainly it was, though the
English liberty and English homes were in the Transvaal. The fact that it
was a foreign government that interfered with their rights did not minimize
the responsibility of England.
" In October, 1892, Bismarck said to Harden : "It is so easy for one who
has some practice, without falsification merely by omissions, to change the
sense. As the Editor of the Ems despatch. .. .1 should know. The King sent
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war and keeping out of it herself,"- "making other nations carry on
wars intended for her benefit."^^ As an ilkistration of the first pol-
icy the attitude of England during the Schleswig-Holstein com-
plication is quoted as follows
:
"In 1864 England encouraged Denmark to resist Prussia and
Austria on account of Schleswig-Holstein, and the Danes relying
on English assurances, refused any compromise, the result being
that they lost their duchies. A Danish friend of mine expressed
himself very vigorously in condemning British statecraft, saying
that the warfare of Prussia was square and honest, but the attitude
of England was unpardonable."
Though some of England's diplomacy in the past has been
both weak and blundering, her action in this affair compares favor-
ably with Germany's. The succession to the duchies received inter-
national sanction by the protocol of London (May 8, 1852), signed
by the five great powers and Norway and Sweden. In 1863, Fred-
erick, Duke of Augustenburg, son of the prince who in 1852 had
renounced the succession to the duchies, next claimed his right on
the ground that he had no share in the renunciation, and assumed
the government under the style of Duke Frederick VIII. With
"this folly," as Bismarck termed it, Austria and Prussia would
have nothing to do. It was clear that they, as signatories to the
1852 protocol must uphold the succession as fixed by it, and that
any action they might take in consequence of the violation of that
compact by Denmark must be so "correct" as to deprive Europe
of all excuse for interference. "From the beginning," Bismarck
admitted later, "I kept annexation steadily before my eyes."^* On
December 28, a motion was introduced in the Diet by Austria and
Prussia calling on the confederation to occupy Schleswig as a
pledge for the observance by Denmark of the compacts of 1852.
This was rejected by the Diet, and Austria and Prussia thereon
decided to act in the matter as independent European powers
(January, 1864). "Flad^^ the Danes yielded to the necessities of
the situation, and withdrawn from Schleswig under protest, the
European powers would probably have restored Schleswig to the
Danish crown, and Austria and Prussia as European powers would
it me with the order to publish it either completely, or in part. After I had
summarized it by deletions, Moltke who was with me exclaimed: "Vorhin zvas
eine Chamade jetzt ist cine Fanfare." Zukunft, October 29, 1892, p. 204; and
December 3, 1892, p. 435.
='0. C, p. 604. ''Ibid., p. 613. ^ Reilections, Vol. II„ p. 10.
°° I quote here the resume of the question in the EncyclopcBdia Britannica,
"Schleswig-Holstein Question," 11th edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 329.
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have no choice but to prevent any attempt upon it by the Duke of
Holstein. To prevent this possibiHty, Bismarck made the Copen-
hagen government beHeve that Great Britain had threatened Prussia
with intervention should hostihties be opened, though (he admitted)
as a matter of fact England did nothing of the kijid. The cynical
strategem succeeded ; Denmark remained defiant, and the Prussian
and Austrian forces crossed the Eider." This explains the fact
that Denmark is in favor of England to-day, and anti-German in
its sympathies.
There is no evidence that England used Japan for the purpose of
humiliating Russia.'" The talk of inveterate enmity between Eng-
land and Russia is by no means justified. The entente with Russia
is an indication that English and Russian policies were not irrecon-
cilable. As to national sympathies, England is (juick to appreciate
the qualities of that "profound and humane people."
The Editor describes the French as theatrical and vain, un-
steady and lacking "the serious insistency of their Teutonic neigh-
bors,"'" and dominated by the idea of "revenge." "The French
are blinded by their vanity, their vaingloriousness. their narrow-
minded hope for revenge. Like big children they became an easy
prey to the British king who ensnared them to fight the battles of
Albion." The Editor's French type reminds one of the comic
Frenchman of fiction. But how are we to explain the fact that the
German army has moved backward from the Marne, and has vainly
attempted to break through the lines of their vain, decadent and
vainglorious enemy? The French idea of revenge is circulated by
Germany, but little has been heard of it in France in recent years.
There is evidence that French statesmen looked on war with Ger-
many as one of the greatest evils that could befall a nation, and the
events of 1905 and 1911 are a proof that she was prepared to pay
a price to avert the ill-will of Germany. As French statesmen
speak of the launching of five threats of war against them by Ger-
many since 1870—the first in 1875 when Moltke wished to bleed
France white, the fifth in 1911—it is hardly to be expected that the
French should have adopted the point of view that "the real interest
of France would naturally lie in an alliance with Germany. . . .this
has often been recognized by Germans, but the French are blinded
by vanity and their narrow-minded hope for revenge. "^^
The war has come ; the French who know their history no
doubt remember the war of 1870-71. Of this war in which Napo-
leon III was a mere puppet in Bismarck's hands, the Editor writes,
''O. C, p. 613. ''Ibid., pp. 613-615. ''Ibid., p. 616.
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"Was not the cause of the war the unjustifiable demand that the
king of Prussia should humiliate himself before the French em-
psror? He should beg pardon for a HohenzoUern prince of an
entirely different line because the Spaniards had offered to the
latter the crown of Spain. "•^'* Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-
Sigmaringen was advised by Bismarck to "abandon all scruples and
accept the candidature in the interests of Germany," and as "a red
rag to the Gallic bull." Prince Bismarck worked the German press
to inflame opinions against France. On the evening of July 8, the
French ambassador Benedetti reached Ems under instructions to
ask King Wilhelm to secure the withdrawal of Prince Leopold.
The King wrote privately to Sigmaringen ; on the 10th, Prince
Karl Anton, father of Prince Leopold, said it was too late to draw
back, but on the 12th, Prince Leopold actually withdrew, and the
news was published in the Kolnischc Zeitiing. Benedetti received
orders to demand an undertaking from King Wilhelm that the can-
didature would never be renewed. The old king refused but added
that he had no hidden designs, and had reason to hope the question
was closed. The German ambassador in Paris sent to Ems for
approval a draft note stating that the king of Prussia had meant
no offense to France. Though irritated, the king sent an aide-de-
camp to Benedetti to report that he had received the official with-
drawal from Sigmaringen and approved of it. The aide-de-camp
added that Benedetti might come to the station at Ems to salute
His Majesty on his departure for Coblentz. As Benedetti bore wit-
ness at Ems "there was neither insulter nor insulted." Bismarck,
as is well known, falsified the telegram summarizing the conver-
sation with Benedetti ; and this "news" made public rendered the
continuance of peace impossible. This was not an affair in which
French diplomacy shone, but what of the Prussian?
With regard to the conditions of peace aftsr the F'rench defeat,
the Editor writes that the surrender of Alsace and a small piece of
Lorraine was demanded for rounding off" the lines of Germany's
defense, and "incidentally it was remembered that the people of
Alsace were Germans, that Alsace had belonged to the German
empire, and its people even in the year 1871 were still speaking
German, "''*' therefore the French should not resent this settlement.
This account avoids the cruelty of the annexation of these
provinces by Germany. Though largely German in speech and
race their inhabitants were for the most part passionately attached
to France. In accordance wnth the Treaty of Frankfort the in-
'' Ibid., p. 615. "" Ibid., p. 616.
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habitants were allowed to choose between French and German
nationality, but all who chose the former had to leave their country.
Some 50,000 did so before October 1872 and settled in France.
Even after this exodus, when in 1874 the provinces were enabled
to elect members for the Reichstag, they sent fifteen deputies who
delivered a formal protest against the annexation and retired from
the House, they formed no party and took little part in the pro-
ceedings except on important occasions to vote against the govern-
ment. Gortchakoff gave warning that the annexation would leave
a wound that would long be a menace to Europe, while Bis-
marck is reported to have said "one does not mutilate with im-
punity. To take Metz and a part of Lorraine was the worst of
political blunders." It will be seen from this account of the feelings
of the two provinces, that the cases imagined by the Editor, of
England clamoring for revenge because the United States were
once English colonies, and Spain clamoring to regain Gibraltar,
are not parallel.
It is difficult to see why the English alliance with Japan (which
has for some time been recognized by the powers as a civilized
power), is condemned''^ by the Editor, while Germany's alliance
with the oriental and unspeakable Turk is welcomed with enthu-
siasm at Berlin. To the German mind Japanese intervention is
cowardly, the Turkish glorious.
JAPAN.
The action of Japan has been so correct that no reasonable
American paper shows a trace of Mr. Randolph William Hearst's
notorious scare on this subject*'- in the Chicago American. The
conclusion is so grotesque that it needs no comment or refutation.
"The attitude of Japan and her procedure against Germany is a
warning. Might we (i. e., America) not overnight have a war on
hand on account of the secret treaties between Japan, England and
Russia in which Mexico and the South American republics would
join just for the fun?"
ANTI-MACCHIAVELLI.
The Editor cj^uotes a few clauses from the testament of Peter
the Great, who ruled from 1689 to 1725, "to show our readers
what it means to support Russia and how little any one can relv
on Russian faith."*'" The dates alone make this contention pre-
'' Ibid., p. 618. "=' Ibid., pp. 618-619.
^ Ibid., p. 620.
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carious ; one could as soon attribute to M. Poincare the ruling
ideas of Louis XIV, or to King George V the methods and aims
of James II. To counterbalance Peter the Great's "testament" the
Editor draws attention to Frederick the Great's Anti-Macchiavelli,^*
issued by Voltaire at the Hague in 1740, and containing not
Frederick's own ideas but a reflection of the generous French
philosophy of the eighteenth century respecting the duty of sov-
ereigns, which may be summed up in the sentence: "The prince
is not the absolute master but only the first servant of the people."
It is however worthy of note that the great Frederick who joined
in the partition of Poland was no believer in honesty in politics.
Of statecraft popularly called Macchiavellian I have found the most
remarkable expressions in German authors such as Bernhardi, who
in speaking of Germany's future*'^ war with France, says "As soon
as we are ready to fight, our statesmen must so shuffle the cards
that France shall appear to be the aggressor,"*'*'—a sentence that
might have been written by the ingenipus author of // Principe.
MODERN WARFARE.
This section attempts the defense of the German army by
stating: (1) that German "atrocities" in Belgium did not take place;
(2) that the Belgians committed atrocities against Germans. With
regard to the first contention it may be pointed out that the only
official inquiry, the Belgian, produces a vast mass of evidence from
sufferers and eye-witnesses ; while the round robin of the five
American reporters*'^ only comes to this, that these five gentlemen,
after spending two weeks with, and accompanying the troops up-
ward of one hundred miles, were "unable to report a single in-
stance unprovoked." This is quite possible with regard to the
districts seen by them, but obviously does not cover the whole
country of Belgium. The German official statement that "the only
means of preventing surprise attacks from the civil population has
been to interfere with unrelenting severity, and to create examples
which by their frightfulness would be a warning to the whole
country" seems by its wording to allow for atrocious treatment of
the civil population.
The destruction of Louvain, whether the civil population fired
upon the Gemians or no, has shocked all neutral countries. The
Editor gives the German official report''® (published in Berlin,
"^Ibid., p. 621. "'Germany and the Next War, published in 1911.
""Ibid., p. 280. "' Quoted in O. C, p. 620.
"" Ibid., pp. 632-633.
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August 20), as disposing of "all the Belgian fables," while he de-
scribes the Belgian account as improbable and lacking verification.*"'
The utmost' that could be said is that the two accounts are incon-
sistent ; and neither side gives "verification." It cannot be said
that the German version disposes of the Belgian, any more than
that the Belgian disposes of the German, as far as evidence is
concerned, though one may have a clear idea as to which story is
the more probable. It is not correct to say that "to reproach the
Germans for burning Louvain is the more unfair as under the
same circumstances every other army would have done the same" ;""
as the English. French and Italian press has repudiated such meas-
ures. The execution of a certain number of Indian rebels as a
definite punishment of the guilty cannot be compared, with the
German treatment of Louvain, Termonde and Aerschot, in which
many innocent civilians, women and children perished. In the
suggestion that Belgians have been guilty of "the most heinous
crimes of battle-hyenas," and that many people have been captured
who found a pastime in torturing German soldiers,'^ no proof is
adduced; and as far as the evidence of hospitals is available the
Vorwdrts, investigating this question, found there was absolutely
no foundation for these imaginary "atrocities."
The final "atrocity" charge made by the German emperor'- to
President Wilson, is that French and English troops make use of
dumdum bullets. Such accusations are easy to make, and no
verification is attempted on the German side ; that is, the German
emperor merely states that "after the capture of the French fort of
Longwy my troops found in that place thousands of dumdum
bullets which had been manufactured in special works by the
French government. Such bullets were found not only on French
killed and wounded soldiers but also on English troops." The
German case was that the government supplied large quantities of
these bullets, and the German legation in Berne invited all and
sundry to go and see the dumdum bullets in their possession
which had, it was said, been taken from French and British sol-
diers. The Journal dc Geneve sent Herr Meyer von Stadelhofen,
the well-known Swiss rifle champion, who also carefully scrutinized
these bullets in the German legation. He reported:
"I noticed first that the transformation had been efifected
with the help of rudimentary tools, such as a file, a saw, or a
'^^ Ibid., p. 628. The Belgian account was issued to the British press on
September 15 by the Press Bureau.
'" Ibid., p. 628. '^ Ibid., p. 634.
'^ Ibid., p. 634.
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puncheon ; secondly, that of these five bullets no two were cut in
the same place, the mark of the instrument having been sometimes
made nearer and sometimes farther from the nose of the bullet
;
thirdly, that the scooping-out was not done in the middle of the
bullet ; fourthly, that the metal had been recently worked, for the
lead was still very bright."
His conclusions, therefore, are that obviously these bullets
were not altered by mechanical means, and that they were not
altered at the time or under the conditions referred to in the Ger-
man note handed to him. To put it plainly, the statements of this
note are not borne out by the examination of the bullets with which
it was accompanied, while, to put it still more plainly, the famous
dumdum bullets were made in Germany, or, at any rate turned into
dumdum bullets there. Herr Meyer von Stadelhofen then asked
whether the secretary of the Berlin foreign office had sent the
German legation in Berne any medical evidence testifying to the
use of dumdum ammunition, to which the answer was "No," an
explanation being added, about which an army surgeon's opinion
would be highly interesting, that "German doctors consider that it is
\irtually almost impossible to know whether a wound is or is not
due to a dumdum bullet, owing to the fact that modern bullets have
such a rotary movement that they often cause wounds similar to
those produced by dumdum bullets, especially when they do not
strike quite direct, as is frequently the case."'^^
Corroborative testimony directly controverting the use of dum-
dum bullets by the allies is that of Dr. Haberlin, a member of the
Ziirich medical association, who acted as a volunteer surgeon in
various military hospitals in Arlen (Grand Duchy of Baden) and
Ludwigsburg, and reported he never heard anything of a dumdum
bullet wound. I have given prominence to these reports of neutrals,
but the memorandum issued from the War Ofifice, dated October
7, denies the use of dumdum bullets by English troops. There is,
the report runs, clear evidence that Germany has not confined her-
self solely to the use of unobjectionable ammunition. Her troops
both in Togoland and in France have been proved to have used
bullets with a soft core and hard thin envelope, not entirely cover-
ing the core, which type of bullet is expanding and therefore ex-
pressly prohibited by The Hague Convention. Such bullets of no
less than three types were found on the bodies of dead native sol-
diers serving with the German armed forces against British troops
in Togoland in August, and on the persons of German European
" Quoted in the Morning Post, October 30, 1914.
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and native armed troops captured by us in that colony. All the
British wounded treated in the British hospitals during the opera-
tions in Togoland were wounded by soft-nosed bullets of large
calibre, and the injuries which these projectiles inflicted, in marked
contrast to those treated by the British medical staff amongst the
German wounded, were extremely severe, bones being shattered
and the tissue so extensively damaged that amputation had to be
performed. The use of those bullets was the object of a written
protest by the general officer commanding the British troops in
Nigeria to the German acting governor of Togoland. Again, at
Gundelu, in b"ranee, on September 19, 1914, soft-nosed bullets (i.e.,
those in which the lead core is exposed and protrudes at the nose)
were found on the dead bodies of German soldiers of the Land-
ivehr, and on the persons of soldiers of the Landivehr made pris-
oners of war by the British troops.
One of these bullets has reached the War Office. It is un-
doubtedly expanding, and directly prohibited by the Hague Con-
vention.
MILITARISM.
In this section the Editor makes a useful distinction between
two uses of the word militarism.'^* With the training of a large
proportion of the citizens of military age for military service,
which is the practice of nearly every country in Europe, few Eng-
lish critics find fault ; though hitherto England, standing outside
the European system, has contented herself with a small profes-
sional army. The French are also "the French nation in arms."^^
The militarism that is condemned by England and France is not
only "the disease of militarism contracted by some members of the
officers' corps at Zabern,"'^' but the political condition characterized
by the predominance of the military class and its armed doctrine.
It was against this subordination to armed doctrine that Theodor
Mommsen warned his constituents at Halle: "Have a care, gentle-
men, lest in this state which has been at once a power in arms and
''' O. C, p. 636. Militarism, according to the Nezv English Dictionary, is
"the spirit and tendencies characteristic of the professional soldier,. .. .the po-
litical condition characterized by the predominance of the military class in
government and administration ; the tendency to regard military efficiency as
the paramount interest of the state."
" Before the war the French army, with 84 per cent of competent men
called up, was even more "a nation in arms" than the German army with only
53 per cent of such men called up.
'* O. C, p. 636. It is hardly correct that militarism in this sense "has never
been worse in Germany than in other countries."
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a power in intelligence, the intelligence should vanish, and nothing
but the pure military state should remain."
GROWING MILITARISM.
Whether a peace party will make an end of armaments" in the
future or whether militarists, the men who believe with Moltke
that universal peace is "a dream and not a pleasant dream," is an
academic question suitable for a debating society, and from its
nature insoluble at the present moment. Other contentions in this
section are that Germany has been converted from a friendly to
an inimical nation, which has been dealt with already, and that
in Germany warfare has developed into a science.'^ '^ "The German
army is a school in which German youths are training to be good
soldiers and the German stafif is also a school in which officers are
instructed in strategy. There is not a Moltke to lead them, but
Moltke's spirit guides them all. Should one of them die to-day,
even if he occupy the highest rank, there are dozens who can take
up his work." Strategy is not the monopoly of the German gen-
eral stafif ; and the German operations on both fronts have hitherto
shown small signs of serious strategy. In the west there was the
occupation of Belgium and, while the way to Calais and Dunkirk
lay open, the rush to Paris. Then the retreat from Paris, a defeat
on the Marne; and—Calais is now the objective! In the east, an
advance toward Warsaw and a strategic retreat with heavy losses.
Some of the army's defects in war were foreseen by a critic of the
manceuvres in 1911 when the military expert of the Times''^ gave
warning that "the German army has seen less of modem war than
any other which stands in the front rank. The contempt which it
displays for the efifects of modern fire, and professes to hold for
armies of naval states with which it may come in conflict can only
be set down to ignorance." But the end tries all, and it is not wise,
as the Editor points out, to discredit the enemy. ^°
ILLUSTRATIONS.
At the close of my examination of the Editor's statement of
''Ibid., pp. 639-640. ''Ibid., p. 642.
"
"There is nothing in the higher leading at the manoeuvres of a distin-
guished character, and mistakes were committed which tended to shake the
confidence of foreign spectators in the reputation of the command. . . .The Ger-
man army, apart from its numbers, confidence in itself and high state of or-
ganization, does not present any signs of superiority over the best foreign
models and in some ways does not rise above the second rate." Times, Oc-
tober 28, 191L
*" The cheerful brutality of Mr. Winston Churchill's speech at a recruiting
meeting at Liverpool in which he used the following words : "If the German
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Germany's case I wish to draw attention to some of the iUustrations
in the October number of The Open Court. As a pendant to the
serious damage to Rheims cathedral the Editor gives a photograph
of the Castle of Heidelberg, and the same juxtaposition of the two
buildings has occurred to German purveyors of picture postcards.
No one defends the ravage of the Palatinate in 1688, but as I have
pointed out we do not draw our precedents from the reign of Louis
XIV. With reference to the three views of Nuremberg, the Editor
writes : "It is almost forgotten that according to newspaper reports,
the first bombs were not dropped over Antwerp or France or Eng-
land, but from French aeroplanes on this city of old German art."
"Newspaper reports" (exclusively in German papers, by the way)
are not sufficient evidence for this statement. It is inconsistent with
the attitude of the French government, which withdrew the French
army six miles from the frontier to prevent a collision before the
outbreak of war^^ and later protested against German bomb-drop-
ping upon and bombardment of unfortified towns.
ENGLAND'S BLOOD-GUILT IN THE WORLD WAR.
The Editor's contribution to the discussion of Germany's case
is by far the largest and most considerable of the papers in the
October number. But there remain two papers to be considered.
That by Professor Burgess^" reproduced from the Springfield Re-
publican brings forward no point of importance, and its value may
be gathered from the fact that he gives up a whole page to an
account of a dinner at Wilhelmshohe with the Emperor, including
a list of the guests. Haeckel's contribution, "England's Blood Guilt
in the World War," like the German appeal "To the Civilized
World," is interesting as showing that German savants have not
realized that assertion is not proof. We read
:
"The parliament and press of the hostile Triple Entente, the
English, French and Russian newspapers are endeavoring. .. .to
throw the whole blame upon Germany. . . .Emperor William II has,
in the twenty-six years of his reign, done everything within his
power to preserve for the German people the blessings of peace. . . .
Similarly, the other two members of the Triple Alliance, Austria-
Hungary and Italy, have ever endeavored to preserve the precious
navy does not come out and fight, they will be brought out like rats in a hole"
(Quoted in O. C, p. 641) is also to be deprecated.
^^
"The French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier
than a distance of 10 kilometers, so as to avoid any grounds for accusations
of provocation to Germany.'' G. B. and the E. C, p. 69.
'' O. C, pp. 587-595.
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blessing of peace and avoid European complications. Rather does
the whole responsibility for the outbreak of this world war fall on
that mighty triple coalition the entente cordiale. . . .
"In the splendid speech from the throne with which Emperor
William II opened the German Reichstag on August 4 he shozved
the real causes that drove the enemies of our German empire to
their insidious attack, envy of the prosperity of the dear father-
land," etc.®^
The method is that of a Free Kirk minister dealing with the
difficulties of belief in the existence of John the Baptist : He began
:
"Some people say John the Baptist did not exist. (Very solemnly)
He did\ Having disposed of that difficulty. ..."
It is the spirit of the German appeal to the civilized world^*
with its many national trumpet-peals, each beginning "It is not
true," sheer denial with no attempt at adducing evidence for the
denial. The appeal might have originated in the Wolff bureau,
not in the minds of savants. As the Nation^^ points out, "Nowhere
is there any evidence of a desire to undertake an unbiased investiga-
tion of facts, logic is thrown to the winds, and we are treated to a
flood of rhetoric and of unsupported statements. . . .It really seems
as if some of the professors who have rushed into print to defend
Germany's cause are doing it quite as much harm as the enemy."
The appeal to the cultured world has destroyed the myth of Ger-
man culture.
The rest of Haeckel's paper is notable only for a few mis-
statements—such as that "Russia in the beginning of August de-
clared war on Germany and Austria, "^^"^ whereas Germany sent an
ultimatum to Russia on July 31,^^ at a time when negotiations were
still proceeding between Russia and Austria,*^ and that England
aims at a world empire, "the annihilation of the independent Ger-
man empire, the destruction of German life and works, the subjection
of the German people to British domination,"^** a dream worthy of
a German mind. The conclusion has a very unlucky prophecy, also
''Ibid., p. 581.
*^ This appeal was published by ninety-three German savants and artists.
Among the signatures are Eucken, Haeckel. Freda, Humperdinck, Sudermann,
Hauptmann, Lamprecht, Kaulbach, Dorpfeld.
"^The Nation (New York), October 29, 1914.
'' O. C, p. 584.
'' G. B. and the E. C, p. 66.
** On July 31, "the Austro-Hungarian ambassador declared the readiness
of his government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Ser-
via." Ibid., p. 69.
'' O. C, p. 585.
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an outcome of German subjectivity, that Germany would find
powerful allies among the nations that already bear England's un-
bearable yoke—Canada, India, Australia, Egypt and South Africa.
Prophecy is of all controversial weapons the most dangerous.
TWELVE POINTS ASSURED.
The only important controversial points in the Editor's Decem-
ber article, "Lessons of the War," are summed up in the section
"Twelve Points Assured," pp. 758-760. The Editor regards certain
l)oints as assured. Could he give any evidence that Russia "offi-
cially" supports a policy of assassination in Servia (p. 758) ? In
the fourth paragraph he assumes that the conflict between Austria-
Hungary and Servia is the result of the assassination of the Arch-
duke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. We now know, thanks to Signor
Giolitti's revelations to the Italian parliament, that the murder of the
archduke and the indictment of Servia's complicity, which figured
so largely in the Austrian ultimatum, had little to do with the set-
tled purpose of Austrian policy. In the middle of 1913 Signor
Giolitti, then Italian prime minister, was informed by the Austro-
Hungarian government that it contemplated immediate action against
Servia and reckoned on the support of Italy under the terms of the
Triple Alliance. The Italian government replied that it could not
regard the action indicated as constituting a casus foederis, which
would never arise out of an aggressive act. This reply induced
Austria-Hungary to postpone action. As the Austro-Hungarian
policy was already set in 1913, it is absurd to speak of it as con-
ditioned by the Sarajevo assassination in 1914. I have 'already dealt
with further points such as the Belgian neutrality and Russian
mobilization. In the case of Germany's "positive evidence that the
Belgians had broken neutrality long before a German soldier set
foot on Belgian soil," the English case is strengthened by Herr
Dernburg's publication of the military convention between England
and Belgium. The proposed help from England, it is definitely
stated in this document, was only to be given after Belgian neutral-
it\ had been violated.
